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Vietnam’s growth in the last one-and-half decades has been driven by the 
liberalization effect and large inflows of external purchasing power. Now that 
the processes of systemic transition and global integration are near completion, 
Vietnam needs to create internal value to continue to grow and avoid the 
“middle income trap.” The country has reached the point where growth towards 
higher income cannot be secured unless policy making is renovated significantly 
to activate the country’s full potential. The vision of Industrialization and 
Modernization by 2020 must be backed by realistic industrial strategies and 
concrete action plans, which are currently lacking. Stakeholder involvement in 
policy design, inter-ministerial coordination, clear directives from the top, and 
incentive structure for government officials must be improved. This in turn calls 
for innovations in policy administration. A new style of leadership, a technocrat 
team directly serving the top leader, and strategic alliance with international 
partners are proposed as key entry points for the renovation of Vietnam’s 
industrial policy formulation. 
 2 
1. Entering a New Era 
 
The Vietnamese economy has grown rapidly with the average growth rate of 7.5% in 
1991-2007. In 1990, Vietnam was among the world’s poorest countries with GDP per capita 
of $98 (ADB data). By 2007, with the GDP per capita of $835, Vietnam is swiftly 
approaching the status of a lower middle income country by the World Bank classification 
method1
 
. The growth is broad-based and touches virtually everyone’s life and generates 
profound social changes in the entire country. This is quite different from the experiences in 
Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa where growth occurs in limited sectors and benefits 
only few people while poor farmers see little improvement in their lives. However, Vietnam’s 
achievements up to now have been driven mainly by one-time liberalization effects and 
external forces associated with global integration rather than internal strengths. Despite 
impressive growth records and reform efforts in the last one-and-half decades, local firms 
remain generally uncompetitive, and policies and institutions remain very weak by East Asian 
standards. 
From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, growth was stimulated by the incentive and 
re-allocation effects of economic liberalization (doi moi). Subsequently, from the mid 1990s 
to present, growth has been supported by new trade opportunities as well as large inflows of 
foreign funds. Industrial activities in Vietnam continue to be dominated by foreign firms, and 
value creation by local firms and workers has been limited. Now that Vietnam is nearing the 
end of the formal processes of systemic transition and global integration, productivity 
breakthrough is needed to climb further. Future growth must be fueled by skill and 
technology rather than a mere injection of purchasing power. 
 
Growth statistics presented in Table 1 are consistent with this interpretation. Until the mid 
1990s, the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) was low and the contribution of total 
factor productivity (TFP) to growth was high, which indicates that growth was achieved 
through improved efficiency--albeit from a very low level of planning years--without much 
investment2
                                                   
1 The World Bank revises country classification annually. Based on the World Bank’s 2007 GNI per capita data, 
the current classification is as follows: low income countries ($935 or less); lower middle income countries 
($936-$3,705), upper middle income countries ($3,706-$11,455); and high income countries ($11,456 or more). 
Separately, the World Bank defines IDA-only countries to be those with per capita income of less than $1,095 
(using 2007 data) and lacking the financial ability to borrow from IBRD. IDA loans are deeply concessional but 
IBRD loans are non-concessional. 
. In the latter period, ICOR rose, TFP’s contribution to growth declined, and 
capital’s contribution increased significantly. That is an indication of investment-driven 
growth with low efficiency in capital use. 
2 ICOR is computed as investment ratio (I/Y) divided by real growth (ΔY/Y). The higher the ICOR, the more 
capital formation is required for growth (i.e., investment is inefficient). TFP is a broad definition of productivity 
calculated as residual growth after the increases in factor inputs such as labor and capital are accounted for. 
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The “Washington Consensus” policy package prescribed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund in the past, such as liberalization, privatization, legal reforms, 
macroeconomic stability, and so on, may achieve middle income if they are properly 
executed, but that is not enough for continued growth to higher income. Vietnam’s growth 
pattern basically follows the past experiences of East Asian neighbors whose features include 
openness and regional integration as an initiator of growth; deepening intra-regional trade and 
FDI; high savings and investment; dynamic transformation of industrial structure; 
urbanization and rural-urban migration; and growth-generated problems such as income and 
wealth gaps, congestion, pollution, financial bubbles, and so on. At the same time, a number 
of new elements for Vietnam, such as faster integration than ASEAN4, must also be 
acknowledged. 
 




















Growth accounting (%) 
ICOR 
Capital Labor TFP 
1990 66.0 6.5 98 2.2% 5.1 6.6 43.9 49.5 3.31 
1991 67.2 7.6 114 2.4% 5.8 8.4 16.9 74.7 2.92 
1992 68.5 9.9 144 2.7% 8.7 13.0 14.5 72.5 2.23 
1993 69.6 13.2 189 3.3% 8.1 41.5 21.6 36.9 3.25 
1994 70.8 16.3 230 3.5% 8.8 39.0 18.5 42.5 3.14 
1995 72.0 20.7 288 3.9% 9.5 39.9 16.2 43.9 3.12 
1996 73.2 24.7 337 4.2% 9.3 36.4 1.5 62.1 3.34 
1997 74.3 26.8 361 4.9% 8.2 54.9 16.0 29.1 3.80 
1998 75.5 27.2 361 7.9% 5.8 64.1 18.6 17.3 5.59 
1999 76.6 28.7 374 6.9% 4.8 62.2 17.4 20.4 6.59 
2000 77.6 31.2 402 6.8% 6.8 47.4 13.8 38.8 4.80 
2001 78.7 32.7 415 7.4% 6.9 59.9 20.6 19.4 4.89 
2002 79.7 35.1 440 7.0% 7.1 44.2 27.7 28.2 5.01 
2003 80.9 39.6 489 7.0% 7.3 72.1 43.7 -15.8 5.09 
2004 82.0 45.4 554 7.2% 7.8 61.5 21.9 16.6 4.91 
2005 83.1 52.9 637 7.6% 8.4 59.8 16.4 23.8 4.68 
2006 84.2 60.9 723 7.2% 8.2 57.1 14.3 28.6 4.88 
2007 85.2 71.1 835 … 8.4 59.5 14.8 25.7 4.90 
 
Sources: General Statistical Office (GSO); Asian Development Bank Key Indicators (2008); For 
growth accounting, Tran Tho Dat, Nguyen Quang Thang and Chu Quang Khoi, “Sources of Vietnam’s 
Economic Growth 1986-2004,” mimeo, National Economics University (2005) for 1990-2004 and 




Within this dynamic East Asian context, Vietnam must successfully conduct three crucial 
policies to sustain growth, namely: (i) generation of internal value; (ii) coping with new 
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social problems caused by rapid growth; and (iii) effective macroeconomic management 
under financial integration. Management of industrialization in this broad sense must be 
installed to face new challenges, or the entire process of industrialization may stall 
(Murakami 1992, 1994). While all three are important, the present analysis focuses on the 




2. The Middle Income Trap 
 
A low income country which has gone through a war, political turmoil, socialist planning, or  
severe economic mismanagement is usually characterized by a fragile economic structure. It 
relies heavily on extractive resources, monoculture export, subsistence agriculture, or foreign 
aid. Internal value created by traditional industries such as mining and agriculture is small, 
but the absence of vibrant manufacturing activities makes them loom large in production and 
trade shares. This is stage zero on a long road to industrialization. 
 
Economic take-off usually starts with the arrival of a sufficient mass of manufacturing FDI 
firms that perform simple assembly or processing of light industry products for export such as 
garment, footwear, and foodstuff. Electronic devices and components may also be produced 
this way. In this early stage (stage one), design, technology, production and marketing are all 
directed by foreigners, key materials and parts are imported, and the country contributes only 
unskilled labor and industrial land. While this generates jobs and income for the poor, internal 
value remains small and foreign created value dominates. Vietnam’s industrialization up to 
now is basically characterized by this situation. 
 
In the second stage, as FDI accumulates and production expands, the domestic supply of parts 
and components begins to increase. This is realized partly by the inflow of FDI suppliers and 
partly by the emergence of local suppliers. As this occurs, assembly firms become more 
competitive and a virtuous circle between assemblers and suppliers sets in. The industry 
grows quantitatively through the internal supply of physical inputs. Internal value creation 
rises moderately, but production basically remains under foreign management and guidance. 
Obviously, local wage and income cannot rise very much if all important tasks continue to be 
performed by foreign hands. Thailand and Malaysia have already reached this stage. 
 
The next challenge is to internalize skill and knowledge by accumulating industrial human 
capital. Locals must replace foreigners in all areas of production including management, 
                                                   
3 The first promotes drivers of growth while the second and the third prepare political stability and social 
support without which industrialization and modernization cannot be sustained. By 2008, social problems such 
as traffic congestion and environmental destruction as well as macroeconomic imbalance arising from recent 
fast growth have become evident in Vietnam. 
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technology, design, parts and components, factory operation, logistics, quality control, and 
marketing. As foreign dependence is reduced, internal value rises dramatically. The country 
emerges as a dynamic exporter of high-quality manufactured products challenging more 
advanced competitors and re-shaping the global industrial landscape. Korea and Taiwan are 
such producers. 
 
In the final stage, the country acquires the capability to create new products and lead global 
market trends. Japan, the US, and some of the EU countries are such industrial innovators. 
 




However, progress is not guaranteed for all. A large number of countries that receive too little 
manufacturing FDI stay at stage zero4. Even after reaching the first stage, climbing up the 
ladders becomes increasingly difficult. Another group of countries are stuck in the second 
stage because they fail to upgrade human capital. It is noteworthy that none of the ASEAN 
countries, including Thailand and Malaysia, has succeeded in breaking through the invisible 
“glass ceiling” in manufacturing between the second and the third stage5
                                                   
4 Low-income countries may receive FDI in mining, telecom, power, tourism, or property development. While 
such projects are lucrative for investors and can generate jobs for the poor and provide basic infrastructure for 
the nation, these alone cannot put the country on a dynamic path of structural transformation as manufacturing 
does. 
. A majority of Latin 
American countries remain middle income even though they had achieved relatively high 
income as early as in the 19th century. This phenomenon can be collectively called the middle 
income trap. 
5 Within ASEAN, the two small nations of Singapore and Brunei have achieved high income through 
non-manufacturing industries (high-value services and oil and gas, respectively) and are therefore beyond the 
scope of our analysis. Figure 1 illustrates manufacturing, especially assembly-type manufacturing such as 
electronics, automobiles and other types of machinery, which has played a key role in East Asia’s growth 
dynamism. 
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East Asian growth performance has differed significantly in depth and speed even among 
countries that are considered “successful.” There should be a clear distinction among Taiwan 
and South Korea (high achievers), Malaysia and Thailand (middle achievers), and Indonesia 
and the Philippines (low achievers). The first group is far ahead of the second or the third in 
terms of income and industrial capability. 
 
Figure 2 shows per capita real income of selected East Asian economies relative to the United 
States level. Until the mid 1960s, these economies (except Japan) showed no clear sign of 
catching up. However, Taiwan and Korea, which started from equally low levels, took off in 
the late 1960s and have improved income dramatically. In comparison, the catching up of 
Malaysia and Thailand looks less impressive, and Indonesia and the Philippines failed to 
improve their positions vis-à-vis the United States. Divergent performance comes from 
different speed of catching up rather than delayed starts (except Vietnam where wars and 
socialist planning prevented economic take-off until the early 1990s). ASEAN4 are taking 
much longer to reach the industrial capability that Taiwan and Korea had achieved in the 
1980s and 90s. 
 
Figure 2.  Different Speed of Catching Up 








































Sources: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennium Perspective, OECD 
Development Centre, 2001; the Central Bank of the Republic of China; and IMF 
International Financial Statistics (for updating 1998-2006). 
Note: Per capita real income relative to the United States as measured by the 1990 




Starting from a very low level, Vietnam is currently in the first stage of industrialization 
trying to reach the second in Figure 1. Large FDI inflows, a necessary condition for this 
transition, are already happening. Neighboring ASEAN countries even fret about losing FDI 
to Vietnam. While Vietnam’s short-term goal is the attainment of physical expansion of the 
industrial base, it should also simultaneously prepare to avoid the middle income trap in the 
next stage. For this, front-loaded and well-targeted policy action for upgrading industrial 
human resources is the key. 
 
In order to overcome the middle income trap, a developing country needs to acquire 
capability to embrace an appropriate industrial vision and implement effective measures 
toward it. Required action is more aggressive than suggested by the Washington Consensus. 
Deregulation, privatization, integration, and providing a sound business environment are 
good enough up to stage two in Figure 1, but insufficient to improve skill and technology and 
break the glass ceiling towards stages 3 and 4. This is true even in the 21st century when 
globalization has deepened and WTO rules and FTA proliferation have significantly narrowed 
the policy space of latecomer countries. 
 
Even under the restricted policy space currently available, however, it is possible to design 
and execute meaningful strategies to accelerate industrialization. For example, the promotion 
of supporting industries and industrial human resources does not violate WTO rules at all. 
Measures to enhance infrastructure, logistics, technology transfer, education and training, 
FDI marketing, SME finance, factory evaluation, industrial parks, and so on, are also 
permissible under the current international regime. 
 
At the same time, it should also be recognized that the catching up of latecomers is becoming 
increasingly difficult for the following three reasons. First, because of forced early integration, 
they are not given temporary protection periods which were available to their predecessors. 
Second, today’s latecomers generally lack a strong private sector comparable to Japanese 
keiretsu groups, Korean chaebols, or Chinese and Indian merchant networks. Third, their 
governments are often without developmental orientation or sufficient policy capability. The 
last two can be regarded as weaknesses associated with the losers’ bias. If they initially had a 
strong private sector and a good government, they would have joined the flying geese much 
earlier and would not have stayed poor until now. How to overcome these latecomer 
problems in the early 21st century will be the topic of the remaining sections. 
 
The point that developing countries must acquire skill and technology, rather than just 
offering factory land and cheap labor, can be stressed in various ways. Below, four such 
arguments are presented to state this point from different angles. 
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First, at the general level, it can be argued that the only way for a country to remain 
competitive is to improve labor productivity faster than wage increase. Competitiveness 
depends on the difference between the two, not on the absolute wage level. Wage increase 
should be a boon to workers, and there is no reason to fear it as long as productivity is 
improving in tandem. In the context of Vietnam, this point has consistently been made by 
Professor Tran Van Tho of Waseda University since the mid 1990s. Under wage pressure, 
Malaysia and China have already stopped inviting labor-intensive FDI projects and turned to 
more “high-tech” investors. Vietnam is also experiencing rising wages as a result of large 
concentration of labor-intensive FDI in some areas such as northern Dong Nai as well as an 
inevitable response to the 2007-08 inflation. If wages begin to rise rapidly now, Vietnam may 
not have enough lead-time to improve productivity. 
 
Second, the concept of manufacturing plus plus, which governed Malaysia’s Second 
Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) 1996-2005, is instructive because it concisely states what 
middle income countries should do to climb up to stage 3. Manufacturing plus plus expresses 
the two dimensional desire for domestic industries to (i) expand along the value chain to 
encompass higher value-added activities; and (ii) uplift the whole value chain by raising 
productivity (Figure 3). Since Malaysia started industrialization as a conventional assembler, 
which was the lowest point in the value chain, it wanted to master R&D, design, product 
development, distribution, marketing, and so on horizontally, and improve the skills of all 
these activities vertically. In principle, this is what Vietnam--and all other latecomers--should 
do. IMP2 selected eight industrial clusters to be thus strengthened: electronics and electricals, 
textiles and apparel, chemicals, resource-based industries, food processing, transportation 
equipment, materials, and machinery. However, Malaysia did not succeed greatly in 
achieving this goal during the implementation period of IMP2 (Ohno 2006). 
 
Figure 3.  The Manufacturing ++ Strategy of Malaysia 
 
Source: Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia (edited by author). 
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Third, the Japanese concept of monozukuri, which literally means “making things,” may give 
some hints on the direction to go. Monozukuri is manufacturing for the primary purpose of 
achieving customer satisfaction through high quality in the spirit of a proud and dedicated 
artisan, rather than just making profit. To achieve this, long-term relationship and internal 
skill and knowledge accumulation are institutionalized within each company as well as 
among partner companies (between assemblers and suppliers, for example). Practical means 
of productivity improvement such as 5S, QCD6
 
, kaizen, just-in-time method, and quality 
control circles have been established and available to companies in the developing world 
through experienced instructors and manuals. In the policy realm, the concept of monozukuri 
is often highlighted by the Japanese government for the purpose of upgrading domestic 
manufacturing capability and spreading the Japanese business model abroad (Tsai 2006). 
Fourth, the theory of business architecture advanced by Takahiro Fujimoto and his research 
team at the University of Tokyo elaborates how firms in developing countries can form 
strategic alliance with Japanese manufacturing firms (Fujimoto 2004, 2006; Fujimoto and 
Shintaku, 2005). According to this theory, business models can be divided into two broad 
categories: modular and integral. Modular manufacturing is characterized by easy assembly 
of globally common parts and components (for example, a desktop computer) while integral 
manufacturing features unique design of parts and components for each model based on 
long-term collaboration among assemblers and suppliers (for example, a passenger car). The 
former is suitable for realizing quick profits under flexible combination of business 
components while the latter permits a continuous pursuit of high quality over time. Fujimoto 
argues that the United States and China are appropriate production partners because they both 
practice modular manufacturing. Meanwhile, Japan is an integral producer without an 
effective international partner. For developing countries, integral manufacturing is harder to 
learn but eventually more rewarding as production technology is internalized rather than 
outsourced. While none of the ASEAN countries has acquired sufficient skill and technology 
for integral manufacturing, Fujimoto regards Thailand and Vietnam as likely candidates for 
Japan’s future monozukuri partner provided that they level up their internal capability 
(Fujimoto and Ohno, 2006). 
 
While the Malaysian experience or the Japanese business model may not fit every country, 
they point clearly to the importance of internal value creation through skill and technology 
and the existence of concrete strategies and methods to attain it. 
                                                   
6 The 5S is the most elementary yet important way to improve production efficiency by keeping the factory tidy 
and well organized. Its elements are seiri, seiton, seiso, seiketsu, and shitsuke, which roughly mean remove 
unnecessary things, arrange tools and parts for easy view, keep the work place clean, maintain personal hygiene, 
and behave with discipline. Meanwhile, QCD means Quality, Cost and Delivery (zero defects, cost reduction, 
and on-time delivery without failure). Japanese manufacturing firms recognize them as the general source of 
competitiveness as well as the criteria for selecting business partners and subcontractors. 
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3. Policy Vision and Orientation 
 
In high performing economies in East Asia, industrial policy actions have usually taken a 
goal-targeting form. The top government leader launches a long-term national vision which 
shows a direction without specifying details. To realize this, appropriate government 
organizations are created or designated to draft feasible strategies and execute concrete action 
plans. Strategies and action plans may be revised as circumstances change, but the long-term 
vision remains intact. 
 
Japan in the 1960s had the goal of doubling income within the decade as well as competing 
effectively with Western multinationals as trade barriers were lifted. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) together with the Japan Development Bank 
coordinated and assisted private efforts in improving productivity. In Malaysia, Vision 2020, 
an aspiration to become a “fully developed country” by 2020 set by former Prime Minister Dr. 
Mahathir in 1991, remains the overarching goal. The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the 
Department of the Prime Minister directs national effort to concretize this vision under a 
system of overlapping policy documents and cascading organizations7
 
. Thailand under Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) put up industrial visions which were both 
ambitious and ambiguous, such as becoming the “Detroit of Asia,” the “Hub of Tropical 
Fashion,” or the “Kitchen of the World,” while leaving the details to be worked out among 
relevant ministries, private businesses, and experts (Ohno 2006). 
This policy formulation method characterized by working backwards from broad goals to 
phased strategies and concrete action plans, making necessary adjustments, and accumulating 
experience and confidence along the way, has been the hallmark of successful East Asian 
development policies. This pragmatism, which we prefer to call Dynamic Capacity 
Development, allowed the gradual building of policy capability as concrete problems and 
challenges were encountered over time. At the beginning of industrialization, most East Asian 
countries had weak governments. In 1960, the Korean civil service was widely viewed as a 
corrupt and inept institution (World Bank 1993). Similarly, in 1959, Thailand was given a low 
mark for the absence of investment planning and an acute shortage of qualified personnel 
(World Bank 1959). But through trials and errors and learning by doing, their administrative 
capacity has greatly improved. This hands-on approach is in sharp contrast to the current 
                                                   
7 Dr. Mahathir advanced nine general challenges without further elaboration: national unity, confidence, 
democracy, moral and ethics, tolerance, science and technology, caring culture, economic justice, and prosperity. 
To achieve this, Malaysia drafts multiple layers of policy documents such as industrial master plans (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry), Outline Perspective Plans (EPU), and Malaysia Plans (i.e., five-year plans, 
EPU). Under MITI, special agencies such as MIDA (FDI policy), SMIDEC (SME promotion), MATRADE 
(trade), and MPC (productivity) have been established. 
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global aid practice, such as the good governance drive8
 
, where all countries are urged to 
correct their weaknesses ex ante relative to some international norm without reference to any 
concrete goal and before formulating a specific growth strategy. 
From this perspective, Vietnam’s industrial vision leaves much to be desired. Vietnam already 
has a long-term vision of attaining industrialization and modernization by 2020. The 
ambiguity of this vision does not worry us too much as with the case of Dr. Mahathir’s 2020 
vision or Mr. Thaksin’s call for the Detroit of Asia. However, the problem with Vietnam is the 
lack of proper strategies, action plans, and institutions to follow up on this vision. The present 
administration system does not permit necessary policies to be implemented. 
 
It is essential that Vietnam formulate as soon as possible a clear roadmap of industrialization 
to inform and guide its people, investors, and policy makers. It should outline a strategic path 
towards the 2020 vision backed by concrete action plans. Vietnam should declare, among 
other things, its strong resolve and clear plan to secure an important position in the East Asian 
production network. It should affirm that the private sector, not the state or state-owned 
conglomerates, should conduct production and investment; that growth should be driven by 
the skill, technology, and hard work of the Vietnamese people; that openness and the market 
mechanism are defended as a matter of principle; and that the state will actively support and 
coordinate the private sector without dictating its production or investment; Policy orientation 
in the areas of savings mobilization, financial development, usage of foreign resources, 
income gaps and other emerging social issues, and sectors under external competitive 
pressure should be clarified. 
 
At present, Vietnam does not have an overall industrial master plan. The industrial sections of 
the Five-year Plan and the Ten-year Strategy do not offer a consistent industrial vision. As a 
result, many important policy questions remain unanswered, including the future roles of 
SOEs, private firms, and FDI, respectively; the choice between export orientation and import 
substitution under deepening integration; and the scope and extent of official support to 
emerging as well as declining industries. Sectoral master plans for steel, automobiles, 
motorcycles, electronics, textile and garment, and so on, are being drafted and approved 
without overarching principles at a higher level. Private investments and official aid pour in 
without knowing exactly where Vietnam is headed in the coming decades. In this connection, 
it should be noted that some countries, with much lower income levels than Vietnam, already 
have industrial visions and action plans which are more consistent and far detailed than those 
                                                   
8  The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) consist of six dimensions: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 





One of the issues in promoting a mechanical industry under globalization is the choice 
between direct and indirect promotion (infant industry promotion versus FDI-led 
industrialization). Malaysia established Proton, a national car company, in 1983 and 
supported it with heavy subsidies and protection. Starting from the knock-down production of 
Mitsubishi Lancer, Proton subsequently internalized capability in styling and design, 
platforms, engines, logistics, marketing, and so on. By 2005, Proton had become the largest 
supplier of passenger cars in Malaysia with the domestic market share of over 40% and 286 
local suppliers producing its parts. However, as globalization deepened, it became apparent 
that Proton’s production volume was too small and technology not high enough to compete 
with global giants from Japan, Korea, EU, and the US. The strategy of internalizing 
capability under strong official support has hit a thick wall. By contrast, Thailand created a 
relatively free environment for FDI car makers to achieve large production volume, quality, 
and even exports. By not insisting on national brands, it succeeded in creating the largest 
automotive cluster in Southeast Asia. However, Thailand’s problem is the slow pace of 
domestic capacity building and the continued dominance of foreign design and technology. 
 
Vietnam has not clearly stated whether or how it wants to promote such industries as 
automobiles, audio-visual devices, home electronics, and general machinery. Under the 
current situation in which discriminatory measures are no longer permitted under WTO rules, 
refraining from supporting such industries and letting the market decide their fate is one 
option. But if Vietnam wants to promote them, it must do some serious thinking to see what 
are realistic goals and what strategies and action plans can be adopted without violating 
international commitments. 
 
4. Policy Making Procedure and Organization 
 
Vietnam’s failure to produce effective industrial strategies and action plans comes mainly 
from the structural weaknesses in policy making. Vietnam’s policy formulation is saddled 
with the legacies of planning days and cannot cope effectively with problems in the age of 
global competition. After the growth bout of the 1990s and the early 2000s driven by 
economic liberalization and large capital inflows, Vietnam has reached the point where 
                                                   
9 Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries with the per capita income of $160 in 2007, established the vision of 
Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) in 1991. Its contents are further specified in the 
Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategy (2003) and other sectoral strategies. This industrial strategy asserts 
the leading role of the private sector, agricultural development as the source of industrialization, 
export-orientation, importance of labor-intensive sectors, the need for strong state guidance, and so on. 
Prioritized sectors are meat, leather and leather goods; agro products; construction; and SMEs. The master plans 
for leather products and textile and garment have been drafted and are being implemented with the help of 
UNIDO, GTZ, USAID, and other donors. 
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further progress towards higher income is increasingly difficult without a radical reform in 
policy formulation procedure and organization. 
 
The problems associated with Vietnam’s industrial policy making are many. However, instead 
of presenting a long list of problems, we will highlight just two procedural problems and two 
organizational problems which are inter-related and constitute the main sources of formalism 
and the general lack of creativity and responsiveness in policy making. These four problems 
shown below are unique to Vietnam in the sense that they are not observable in East Asia’s 
other high performing economies10
 
. 
The most serious procedural problems in designing and executing industrial strategies and 
action plans are the lack of involvement of the business community and the lack of 
inter-ministerial coordination, which together render approved policies ineffective and even 
unimplemented. In any developing country, policy implementation is a big challenge due to 
shortages of budget, human resources and proper mechanisms. However, the proportion of 
unimplemented policies in Vietnam is exceptionally high not only in industrial matters but 
also in other policy areas. It can even be said that very few policies are actually implemented 
as stipulated in Vietnam because of delays in preparing “implementation details;” the 
non-provision of necessary budget, personnel or equipment; the lack of support from the 




The policy making process in Vietnam is closed within the government with little 
involvement of other stakeholders. Within each ministry, the order to draft a master plan is 
handed down to a drafting team, which normally consists of a middle-ranking official leading 
a few experts in the ministry. The team collects internal data and data from other ministries, 
and may commission additional analyses to experts in other ministries or research institutes. 
The budget for each master plan is fixed by an inter-ministerial circular and used mainly for 
securing external data and analyses as well as conducting domestic travel, interviews and 
hearings. The master plan is drafted by the team members and submitted to the minister or the 
vice minister in charge for internal review. After that, it is circulated among relevant 
ministries for comment (which is rarely substantive) and then submitted to the prime minister 
for final approval. Significant delay may occur at internal review or final approval. Demand 
for revision is also common. In this process, debates on a fundamental direction or crucial 
                                                   
10 In 2005 and 2006, the Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) and Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry (MOI) 
organized joint research missions to Thailand, Malaysia and Japan to study the design, implementation and 
monitoring of industrial policies of respective countries. For missions’ findings, see Ohno (2006). 
11 In response to the protestation by FDI firms about certain parts of an industrial master plan, an official who 
drafted it reassured them that there was no need to worry because master plans in Vietnam were not 
implemented. 
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issues rarely take place. The drafting team is routinely overworked with a large number of 
master plans to finish each year, which does not allow sufficient time (or money) to think 
creatively, interact with non-government stakeholders, or publicize the final result. Approved 
master plans are neither translated into English nor uploaded for dissemination although 
summary versions for the prime minister’s approval, in the Vietnamese original, are usually 
available on the web. 
 
If a domestic or foreign firm wants to raise its voice, it must devise its own way since the 
current procedure does not allow meaningful involvement of the business community. 
Although enterprise hearings are becoming more popular in recent years, sufficient details of 
the master plan draft are not revealed at such hearings and enterprises therefore can only 
make general requests. If a firm later finds certain points in the master plan objectionable (for 
example, demand forecasts, taxes and import duties, numerical output or export targets, 
designation of producers for certain products, and so on), it needs to seek meetings with 
responsible ministries, use symposiums and media to make the point, or write a letter to the 
prime minister, to request a change in the already approved policy. This situation is in sharp 
contrast to Malaysia, where private sector participation is institutionalized as members of the 
steering committee and task forces in drafting the Industrial Master Plan; Thailand, where the 
private sector decides targets and action plans and the government merely accepts them; or 
Japan, where business decisions on technology, products, investment and so on are left to 
individual firms and the government provides only supplementary works such as trade 
negotiation and setting standards for quality, safety, environment, and industrial property 
(Ohno, 2006). 
 
Another procedural problem is the absence of inter-ministerial coordination on policy 
substance as well as implementation details, which in turn comes from the lack of mechanism 
to force different ministries to work together. Compartmentalization of the government along 
ministerial lines is a common problem around the world, but most governments manage to 
somehow ameliorate it. One solution is to have a strong top leader with a good economic 
mindset who directs various ministries and becomes the hub of policy making himself. In this 
case, policy components become mutually consistent even though ministries still fail to talk 
to each other (Thailand under Thaksin Shinawatra, 2001-06; Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi, 
1991-present). Another way is to establish a powerful technocrat team directly serving the 
president or the prime minister which makes key development decisions while ministries 
become executing agents of the plans emanating from this team (South Korea’s Economic 
Planning Board, 1961-1994; also see below). Still another way is to let a super ministry, with 
sufficient policy authority and instruments at its disposal, lead industrial policy making and 
be responsible for it (Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the 1960s). 
Finally, it is also possible to install a mechanism to guarantee the representation of all 
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relevant ministries and non-government stakeholders in the official drafting process as well 
as in informal exchange (Malaysia’s drafting of the Industrial Master Plan at present). In 
Vietnam, though all policy documents specify a leading ministry and a list of related 
ministries, the mechanism to make them work as one is entirely missing. 
 
We can go deeper to see why it is difficult to ensure involvement of non-government 
stakeholders and inter-ministerial coordination. Behind these problems lie fundamental issues 
in policy making organization. The most serious ones in this regard are the lack of clear 
directives from the top and the distorted incentive mechanism among government officials to 
encourage brain drain. 
 
It is well known that Vietnam’s decision making is based on consensus. Checks and balances 
are in place horizontally (across ministries and departments), vertically (between central and 
local levels) and geographically (North, South, Middle and remote areas). There are three top 
leaders and the Party and the Government interact in a complex manner. This system can 
produce stability and continuity but it is not suitable for staging bold reforms or responding 
quickly to the changing world. Policies remain mostly reactive rather than pro-active. 
Development effort centered on a clear roadmap towards a national vision with concrete 
strategies and action plans, which is the hallmark of East Asian industrialization, is entirely 
missing in the Vietnamese policy process. 
 
The Vietnamese government copes with urgent issues--be it inflation or traffic jam--in a 
bottom-up fashion and without a clear focal point of leadership or responsibility. When a 
serious problem is identified, an inter-ministerial committee is called and its chair is 
appointed. Each ministry proposes solutions from its perspective, which are summarized into 
general policy recommendations without execution details. Bureaucracy can supply broad 
ideas touching every aspect of the problem, but it does not lead to prioritization or selectivity 
for real action. This approach must be supplemented by a person or an organization that 
decides on a short list of actions and sequencing of measures among many proposals. There 
should be an interaction between the high level and the implementing level of the government 
to produce policies which are both realistic and sharply focused. 
 
Another problem which is common in many countries and also becoming highly visible in 
Vietnam is the decline of quality and morale among government officials, prompting an 
exodus of talented people to other sectors. Vietnam’s public service must overcome the 
problems of overstaffing, low salary, prevalence of second jobs, formalism, rigidity, nepotism, 
corruption, relation-based promotion, and aid-related benefits (foreign travel, training, 
benefits associated with supervising ODA projects, etc). These were the legacies of the 
subsidy system existing up to the 1980s, where the public sector was the provider of jobs, 
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minimum income and social security for all and where no alternative employment 
opportunities were available in the private or foreign sectors with far more attractive salaries 
and rewarding duties. Under the present circumstance of market orientation and global 
integration, the public sector only attracts people who want stability, people who genuinely 
believe in the importance of public service, or people who want to take advantage of official 
privileges to study abroad or receive training as a stepping stone to a better-paying job in the 
future. As a result, highly qualified and motivated people are becoming difficult to recruit or 
retain. 
 
This problem cannot be solved by minor repairs or ad hoc adjustments. ODA-supported 
training programs of government officials may only worsen the brain drain without raising 
the average level of competency. To reverse the hollowing-out of the Vietnamese government, 
far reaching reforms to completely remake the public administration is needed as soon as 
possible. This should encompass, among others, a significant down-sizing of the public sector 
through leaner organization, forced retirement, and outsourcing of non-essential services; a 
competitive and transparent recruitment system; a higher and performance-based salary 
schedule and promotion linked to fair personnel evaluation; and clear rules regarding the 
conduct of public servants and their interaction with citizens, businesses, and service 
providers. Obviously, these are not easy because of the magnitude of required tasks and 
political resistance. But they are also absolutely necessary for Vietnam to move forward. No 
East Asian country has overcome the middle income trap without installing an effective 
public administration. It should also be mentioned that the initiative for such reforms must 
come from the top rather than the bottom. No bureaucracy can transform itself so radically 
without the order from a strong leader. 
 
5. How to Break a Solidified System 
 
To propose a solution is one thing. To carry it out is quite another. Even if Vietnam knows the 
best policy formulation procedure and organization, how can it make sure that they are 
actually adopted? 
 
According to comparative institutional analysis, a branch of institutional economics that 
relies heavily on evolutionary game theory, a society may get stuck in a bad equilibrium 
owing to institutional complementarity, strategic complementarity and path dependence 
(Aoki 2001a, 2001b). Institutional complementarity means that any social system has 
resilience to shocks because its institutional components enhance each other. For example, 
Vietnam’s education, recruitment, salary and promotion systems are mutually complementary 
to produce relation-based rent sharing. Strategic complementarity means that individuals in 
such an institutionally solidified society have little incentive to deviate from the dominant 
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behavior. Finally, path dependence underscores the importance of the beginning. Once 
installed by chance or design, any social system requires a large amount of political and 
social energy to change it. Together, these concepts point to institutional inertia and difficulty 
of reforming any established system. 
 
Policy impasse arises when an inefficient method of policy formulation is set up and then 
solidified, and institutional components and people’s attitude to support it have formed. 
Removing one person or reforming one organization does not improve the situation because 
of institutional and strategic complementarity mentioned above. Changing the policy 
formulation system in a fundamental way, as proposed by this paper, will surely require 
enormous energy and meet fierce resistance. 
 
However, this does not mean that there is no way out. There are times when a system jumps 
to another system. Comparative institutional analysis suggests the following occasions and 
agents of change. 
 
(i) Collective mutation--a large number of people inside a society may mutate 
simultaneously, as if their DNA has changed. If only a few people behave 
differently, they are simply called “crazy” or “silly” and the system remains 
unchanged. But a sufficiently large mass begin to behave differently, 
institutional and strategic complementarities of the old type stop working and 
rules and customs start to change. This is a spontaneous and internally driven 
change, which may occur when a large number of people feel suppressed or 
victimized under the existing system. In a rapidly growing economy, this may 
also happen when a generation with new values and behavioral patterns grow 
up, or when people begin to have new demands and expectations from the 
government as a result of successful development and higher income. A small 
incident may trigger a large social movement by letting accumulated public 
discontent to come to the open. 
 
(ii) Foreigners--foreign governments, firms and individuals follow different 
systems and are not bound by the behavioral code of the domestic society. 
They bring and sometimes even force new elements, which causes friction 
and inconsistencies with the indigenous system. In low income countries, 
bilateral donors and international organizations are particularly powerful. 
Foreign firms and investors as well as international migration and personnel 
exchange may also produce foreign pressure on a society. If this prompts a 
change in a desirable direction that generates healthy development, such 
pressure is highly welcome. However, not all foreign influences are good from 
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the viewpoint of social evolution. For this reason, the government must guide 
and coordinate foreign pressure to prevent undesirable changes. 
 
(iii) Policy--even without domestic or foreign pressure, the government can start a 
change by introducing policies that upset existing calculations and 
complementarities. Here the key question is who will activate such policies. 
As noted before, it is extremely difficult for bureaucrats to initiate a bold 
reform. Their power within the government is miniscule compared with 
enormous institutional and strategic complementarities they face. Drastic 
policy shifts are usually introduced when a new, strong top leader comes to 
power. Leadership equipped with strong will and economic literacy is crucial 
for this to succeed. 
 
In view of these general implications of comparative institutional analyses, three players that 
may make such reforms possible in the Vietnamese context are identified. They are 




Crucial importance of leadership is made sufficiently clear in the discussions above. 
Leadership is the prime force of change while other necessary conditions can be created or 
reshaped by the leader if they do not already exist. In countries with advanced political 
systems, policy initiative can also emerge from various domestic groups such as civil society 
organizations, intellectuals, interest groups, and political parties because legal mechanisms to 
capture and reflect their opinions are firmly in place. However, in developing countries where 
political systems are less well developed, only a small number of channels of effective 
participation are available. For all practical purposes, initiative for bold change in these 
circumstances must come from the top leader. When such leadership is combined 
constructively with the aspiration of domestic groups and foreign pressure, reforms become 
possible. For the leader to play proper roles in development, it is not always necessary to 
change the existing political regime or expending social energy to change it. The Vietnamese 
political regime at present is flexible enough to allow a strong leader with political savvy to 
emerge and orchestrate policies. 
 
The technocrat team 
 
In high performing economies of East Asia, the existence of a technocrat team directly under 
the top leader (the president or the prime minister) has played a crucial role. This team is 
created from the brightest officials from various ministries as well as the smartest returnees 
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who have studied or taught abroad. It receives full confidence and responsibility from the top 
leader to concretize the policies that this leader envisions. It also acts as the command post 
for all ministries which are obliged to implement the policies that this team drafts. It acts as 
the nation’s brain for development without which even excellent leaders cannot function. The 
Economic Planning Board in South Korea, the Kuomintang technocrats in Taiwan, the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in Malaysia, the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB) in Thailand, the so-called Berkley Mafia in Indonesia, and the National 
Economic Development Authority (NEDA) in the Philippines, all aimed to perform this way 
at certain critical points in their economic development with varying degrees of success. 
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), although being one of the 
ministries rather than above all ministries, also operated effectively to strengthen the 
competitiveness of Japanese manufacturing industries in the high growth period of the late 
1950s and 1960s. 
 
Vietnam also had the Prime Minister’s Research Commission (PMRC) until recently, but it 
was an advisory group rather than a central policy making body entrusted with the power to 
lead the entire government. Its responsibility was too weak and its members were 
experienced but perhaps too old.  Nor does Vietnam have a super-ministry such as Japan’s 
MITI to centrally coordinate development effort; the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPI) is not strong enough in terms of authority, capability and policy instruments to 
undertake this task. It is strongly suggested that Vietnam create a new dynamic technocrat 
team within the government as a focal point of policy making authority and responsibility. In 
its design, experiences of other East Asian countries, with proper modifications, should be 
useful. Vietnam needs such a team at least for the next few decades to climb to higher income 




Vietnam’s foreign policy shifted dramatically in the early 1990s when the close ties with the 
Soviet bloc were replaced by multi-directional diplomatic relations and re-integration into the 
global economy. Since then, interaction with foreign actors has exerted indirect and subtle 
influences on Vietnam’s development orientation although the Vietnamese government never 
allows foreigners to take the driver’s seat (I. Ohno, 2005). Bilateral and multilateral donors 
have registered their desire to see faster reforms, more transparency and administrative 
efficiency in the semi-annual consultative group (CG) meetings, comments on the Five-year 
Plan and the Ten-year Strategies, policy dialogue for the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) and the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), and so on. 
Foreign businesses also have pressed the government to improve the legal and policy 
framework, the tax and import duty system, and other business-related matters through the 
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Vietnam Business Forum, government-business dialogue, trade fairs, and symposiums. As 
Vietnam graduates from a low income transition country into the status of an industrializing 
middle income country, the focus of foreign concern should also shift from the removal of the 
negatives to the creation of Vietnam’s unique strengths. 
 
As the leading economy in East Asia, Japan has also contributed significantly to Vietnam’s 
development through trade, investment, aid, and human and knowledge exchange. Japanese 
businesses and officials are particularly interested in bolstering Vietnam’s industrial 
competitiveness and have conducted a number of bilateral programs to this end. They include 
the building of infrastructure especially in power and transportation, education and training of 
industrial human resources, and a series of action-oriented bilateral policy dialogues (Table 
2). 
 
These bilateral dialogues aim to improve Vietnamese policies where Japan has particular 
interest or comparative advantage. At the same time, they have the additional purpose of 
(partially) correcting the weaknesses of Vietnam’s policy formulation by introducing new 
procedures and organizations. For example, concrete action plans are bilaterally agreed and 
rigorously monitored to prevent non-implementation (the New Miyazawa Initiative, the 
Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative, and the proposed Vietnam-Japan Monozukuri Partnership). 
Inter-ministerial cooperation is ensured by making the leading ministry, typically MPI, 
responsible for the participation of all other ministries (the Ishikawa Project, the 
Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative, and the proposed Vietnam-Japan Monozukuri Partnership). 
And active involvement of non-government stakeholders (especially major manufacturers) 
was enforced throughout the joint drafting process of the Motorcycle Master Plan—perhaps 
for the first time in Vietnam’s master plan drafting. Japanese officials and businesses are well 
aware of the structural shortcomings of Vietnam’s policy making, and they are willing to 
spend time and energy to work with the Vietnamese side to work out a solution, without 
which they know their dialogue will not lead to meaningful actions. 
These policy dialogues have so far been initiated mainly from the Japanese side. It is 
suggested that the Vietnamese government should be more pro-active in improving its policy 
formulation and inviting Japan (and other countries) to participate in the effort. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
While Vietnam’s past achievements as a developing and transition country are great and many, 
this paper has focused on the future and offered candid evaluation and advice so that Vietnam 
might develop its potential to the fullest extent. I trust that the Vietnamese people and 
government are not satisfied by merely achieving MDGs or stopping at middle income. Their 
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aspiration must be set higher, and it is surely attainable if the nation clearly identifies its 
present shortcomings and squarely faces its challenges. 
 
 
Table 2.  Vietnam-Japan Bilateral Policy Dialogue for Industrial Competitiveness 
 
Program Period Principal actor(s) Content 
Ishikawa Project (Study 
on the Economic 
Development Policy in 
the Transition toward a 
Market-oriented 
Economy in Vietnam) 
1995-2001 
(3.5 phases) MPI-JICA 
Joint research on macroeconomics, finance, 
agriculture, industry, integration, currency crisis, 
SOE reform, private sector development (PSD); 
based on the principle of country ownership and 




Reform Support Loan) 
1999-2000 JBIC 
Quick disbursing loan (20 billion yen) with 
conditionalities in PSD, SOE auditing, and 
tariffication of non-tariff barriers. Action plans in 
PSD were monitored and evaluated. 
Vietnam-Japan Joint 
Initiative to Improve 
Business Environment 







Bilateral agreement and implementation of 
concrete action plans which were monitored and 
reported to high-level, with focus on removal of 
FDI/business impediments, strengthening of local 
capabilities, and drafting of missing industrial 
strategies. 
Joint Work between 





Analyses by Vietnamese and Japanese experts as 
inputs to the drafting of the Five-year Plan 
2006-2010, with attention on industrial policy 
formulation and competitiveness issues of 
individual industries (automobile, electronics, 
supporting industries, etc). 
Joint drafting of 
Motorcycle Master Plan 








Drafting of master plan following new content and 
method, with active participation of large 
motorcycle assemblers and interaction with other 
stakeholders; VDF serving as facilitator. Master 









Build strategic partnership for monozukuri 
(high-skill manufacturing) with Japan transferring 
its know-how to Vietnam. Action plans for 
supporting industry promotion to be implemented 
with joint effort. 
 
Abbreviations: 4J (Japanese Embassy, JICA, JBIC, JETRO), JICA (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency), JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation), JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organization), MPI (Ministry of Planning and Investment), MOI (Ministry of Industry), VJJI2 
(Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative Phase 2), GRIPS (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), 
NEU (National Economics University), VDF (Vietnam Development Forum), PSD (private sector 




Vietnam has reached the point where further progress towards higher income can be secured 
only if internal value creation is enhanced. This calls for proper government action, rather 
than laissez-faire, to guide and complement private sector dynamism and avoid the middle 
income trap. 
 
To improve policy quality, Vietnam needs to change the policy formulation process. This in 
turn requires a radical change in the public administration system. However, the change must 
be achieved in a way that preserves political and social stability rather than destroys it. The 
scope and sequencing of reforms must also be chosen carefully to minimize the political and 
social energy needed to change the system while maximizing their positive impacts. This 
paper proposed focused leadership, a new technocrat team, and strategic partnership with 





Aoki, Masahiko (2001), Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity: 
Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and the Transitional Economies, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Aoki, Masahiko (2001), Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press 
 
Fujimoto, Takahiro (2004), Nihon no Monozukuri Tetsugaku (Japan’s Monozukuri 
Philosophy), Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha. 
 
Fujimoto, Takahiro (2006), “Architecture-based Comparative Advantage in Japan and Asia,” 
in K. Ohno and T. Fujimoto eds, 2006. 
 
Fujimoto, Takahiro, and Junichiro Shintaku (2005), Architecture-based Analysis of Chinese 
Manufacturing Industries, Toyo Keizai Shimposha. 
 
GRIPS Development Forum (2002), Japan’s Development Cooperation in Vietnam: 
Supporting Broad-based Growth with Poverty Reduction, May (English, Japanese, 
Vietnamese). 
 
Ichikawa, Kyoshiro (2005), “Building and Strengthening Supporting Industries in Vietnam: A 
Survey Report,” chapter 4, Kenichi Ohno and Nguyen Van Thuong (eds), Improving 
Industrial Policy Formulation, Vietnam Development Forum and The Publishing 
House of Political Theory, Hanoi. 
 23 
 
Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007), For Sound Development of the Motorbike Industry 
in Vietnam, Publishing House of Social Labor (English and Vietnamese). 
 
Murakami, Yasusuke (1992), Hankoten no Seijikeizaigaku (Anti-classical Political Economy), 
vol.2, Chuo Koron Sha, Tokyo. English translation by Kozo Yamamura, 
Anti-Classical Political Economy, Stanford University Press, 1996. 
 
Murakami, Yasusuke (1994), Hankoten no Seijikeizaigaku Yoko: Raiseiki no tameno 
Oboegaki (Outline of Anti-classical Political Economy: A Memorandum for the Next 
Century), Chuo Koron Sha, Tokyo. English translation of Chapter 6 in Ohno and 
Ohno (1998). 
 
Nguyen Thi Xuan Thuy (2007), “Supporting Industries: A Review of Concepts and 
Development,” chapter 2, Ohno ed (2007). 
 
Ohno, Izumi, ed (2005), True Ownership and Policy Autonomy: Managing Donors and 
Owning Policies, GRIPS Development Forum, National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies. 
 
Ohno, Kenichi, ed (2006), Industrial Policy Formulation in Thailand, Malaysia and Japan: 
Lessons for Vietnamese Policy Makers, Vietnam Development Forum, 2006 (English 
and Vietnamese). 
 
Ohno, Kenichi, ed (2007), Building Supporting Industries in Vietnam, vol.1, Vietnam 
Development Forum (English and Vietnamese). 
 
Ohno, Kenichi (2008), “The East Asian Growth Regime and Political Development,” chapter 
2, GRIPS Development Forum, Diversity and Complementarity in Development Aid: 
East Asian Lessons for African Growth, Tokyo. 
 
Ohno, Kenichi (2008), “Vietnam-Japan Monozukuri Partnership for Supporting Industries: 
For Leveling Up Vietnam’s Competitiveness in the Age of Deepening Integration,” 
Vietnam Development Forum, August. 
 
Ohno, Kenichi, and Izumi Ohno, eds (1998), Japanese Views on Economic Development: 
Diverse Paths to the Market, Routledge, London and New York. 
 
Ohno, Kenichi, and Takahiro Fujimoto, eds (2006), Industrialization of Developing 
 24 
Countries: Analyses by Japanese Economists, 21st Century COE Program, National 
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. 
 
Tsai, Mon-Han (2006), “The Myth of Monozukuri: Manufactured Manufacturing Ideology,” 
ITEC Working Paper Series 06-04, Doshisha University, March. 
 
Vietnam Development Forum (2007), “Supporting Industries in Vietnam from the Perspective 
of Japanese Manufacturing Firms,” chapter 1, Ohno ed (2007). 
 
Vietnam Development Forum (2008), “Vietnam-Japan Monozukuri Partnership for 
Supporting Industries: For Leveling Up Vietnam’s Competitiveness in the Age of 
Deepening Integration,” a document prepared for bilateral action plans to promote 
supporting industries in Vietnam, August. 
 
Watanabe, Toshio (1995), Shinseiki Asia no Koso (Designing Asia for the New Century), 
Chikuma Shinsho, Tokyo. Partly translated and published as chapter 11 in Ohno and 
Ohno (1998). 
 
World Bank (1959), A Public Development Program for Thailand, Report of a Mission 
organized by the IBRD at the request of the Government of Thailand, The Johns 
Hopkins Press. 
 
World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford 
University Press. 
